This project has grown out
of thinking about the tradition of the
recitation of the Addyatmaramayanam in Kerala.
How
can we understand
this practice, located as we are in the university? There is no dearth
of discourses - in the form of literary criticism or anthropological
theories - about such practices. However, such theorising cannot
capture an element that is fundamental to these practices – simply,
that they are practices. The Addhyatmaramayanam
has to be recited, the
parayanam has to be performed, it has to be listened to. (Not really,
some would say; this is discussed here.)
These are
practices that are embodied; their efficacy is achieved through
performance. There are no reasons or explanations that a self
considers before embarking on these practices. It is the practices that
activate and form one's self. Theory is the production of a disengaged,
disinterested subject; practice by definition requires involvement..
The assumption of a primal secular self
is essential to the university discourse, and in that way this project
seeks a non-secular understanding of such practices as the parayanam.
This point merits elaboration. The knowledge that is generated and distributed in the university revolves around concepts and conceptual thinking. Concepts are intellectual entities, and as such they can be universal. To 'know' means to possess concepts, since they are what underlie actions and phenomena. Therefore Socrates dismisses Ion as being ignorant of his art, despite the latter being a reputed rhapsode. If practice consists of the application of concepts, then a practitioner without concepts has no genuine knowledge.
Therefore, in the case of the parayanam, elements such as voice and rhythm will be exteriorised, since concepts do not require voice or rhythm. Of course, these can also be conceptualised. (Here, the move to conceptualise is the move to aesthetics.) So it is possible for some literary or anthropological theory to try to explicate the concepts behind the parayanam. This would involve some kind of a reductionism. But, how do we 'reduce' an embodied performance? ('Reading' as an instance of performance is discussed here.)
This is where such practices as the parayanam find the assumptions of the above discourse out. Such performances have to be taken as basic, since bodily acts are nonlinguistic, nonconceptual. One cannot presume a secular self that has a spiritual or a religious (or whatever one wishes to call it) experience, such that if the spirituality or religiosity is avoided, one can see plainly and properly the concepts of the practice.
So, there are practices and there are discourses about practices. The practices might speak about themselves, but since they are embodied, discourses about them can at best be informative. As dancer Isidora Duncan is reputed to have said, “If I could say it, I wouldn't have to dance it.”
This, however, does not imply a muteness around practices. They will have talk in and around them. So what is the difference between this 'talk' and discourse? Firstly, the importance of utterance and voice in the Ramayanaparayanam traditions means that these are certainly not 'mute'. But that does not answer the question. If it is said in the tradition that pronouncing the 'rama namam' will help achieve a purity of mind ('manasuddhi'), how is this not a discourse about the practice? Systematic justification is rarely proffered in Indic traditions. Justifications or explanations are often local and severely contextual; so much so, that they might not qualify to be justifications or explanations at all. What is said about manasuddhi, for instance, need not connect to some metaphysics which plays a determinate role in the traditions. This is why there is a rarity of theoretical reflections about practices in Indic traditions.
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This point merits elaboration. The knowledge that is generated and distributed in the university revolves around concepts and conceptual thinking. Concepts are intellectual entities, and as such they can be universal. To 'know' means to possess concepts, since they are what underlie actions and phenomena. Therefore Socrates dismisses Ion as being ignorant of his art, despite the latter being a reputed rhapsode. If practice consists of the application of concepts, then a practitioner without concepts has no genuine knowledge.
Therefore, in the case of the parayanam, elements such as voice and rhythm will be exteriorised, since concepts do not require voice or rhythm. Of course, these can also be conceptualised. (Here, the move to conceptualise is the move to aesthetics.) So it is possible for some literary or anthropological theory to try to explicate the concepts behind the parayanam. This would involve some kind of a reductionism. But, how do we 'reduce' an embodied performance? ('Reading' as an instance of performance is discussed here.)
This is where such practices as the parayanam find the assumptions of the above discourse out. Such performances have to be taken as basic, since bodily acts are nonlinguistic, nonconceptual. One cannot presume a secular self that has a spiritual or a religious (or whatever one wishes to call it) experience, such that if the spirituality or religiosity is avoided, one can see plainly and properly the concepts of the practice.
So, there are practices and there are discourses about practices. The practices might speak about themselves, but since they are embodied, discourses about them can at best be informative. As dancer Isidora Duncan is reputed to have said, “If I could say it, I wouldn't have to dance it.”
This, however, does not imply a muteness around practices. They will have talk in and around them. So what is the difference between this 'talk' and discourse? Firstly, the importance of utterance and voice in the Ramayanaparayanam traditions means that these are certainly not 'mute'. But that does not answer the question. If it is said in the tradition that pronouncing the 'rama namam' will help achieve a purity of mind ('manasuddhi'), how is this not a discourse about the practice? Systematic justification is rarely proffered in Indic traditions. Justifications or explanations are often local and severely contextual; so much so, that they might not qualify to be justifications or explanations at all. What is said about manasuddhi, for instance, need not connect to some metaphysics which plays a determinate role in the traditions. This is why there is a rarity of theoretical reflections about practices in Indic traditions.
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